F riedrich Schiller's Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man
are worth rereading today from the troubled fronts of politics and pedagogy.
1 While the United States government stays stuck in Afghanistan and Iraq, where the reason for war and its excesses is to defend democracy, and while economic and immigration crises follow from apparently reasonable analyses, we might remember Schiller's concern about the French Revolution. France had run headstrong behind reason into a "barbarism" that toppled an existing state in order to establish the ideal state. Specters of that abstract and unfeeling reason have also driven our public schools to quantitative measurement of student achievement and to the elimination of opportunities to exercise the free play of imagination through arts. Public education, so earnestly bent on practical results that it squeezes out room and resources for play in favor of adding another math class or prep session, hopes to raise scores on standardized tests. Ironically for educators and tragically for children, the sacrifice of divergent creative play on the altar of convergent correctness has actually kept the scores down because the tests measure more than data retrieval. They also gauge students' free thinking critical faculty, which depends on the exercise of imagination that Schiller called play. Schools are failing our children, in part at least, through indifference or excessive caution about creativity.
Surely the connection between the eroded room for political debate and a play-starved education is worth worrying about again if worry leads to ways beyond the crisis. Too often, academic essays offer analysis and critique but stop short of speculation about possible remedies, as if intellectual work excluded an element of play that explores what Schiller called imaginative "appearances" of alternative arrangements. In fact, academic essays that remain risk-averse miss the potential of the genre to "assay" or to try out ideas. I confess to a preference for the risk of possibilities and therefore invite you to consider joining Schiller and company. As advocates for an aesthetic education that promotes making art, not only appreciating it, we can promote the development of an in-nate drive to play, the Spieltrieb or the playdrive, that Schiller identified as our creative faculty for turning conflict into beautiful works of art. Rereading Schiller in the company of other reformist educators, who directly or indirectly follow him, may offer a few unanticipated connections. But the spotty genealogy will be a very modest contribution to scholarship. My real purpose here, more practical than scholarly-and in the spirit of the Aesthetic Education itself-is to prime our urgent conversations with Schiller's enduring, almost eerily contemporary, invitation to loosen up and to play.
Let's Loosen Up
Our humanity depends on it, he was sure, because playfulness for Schiller is no frivolous pastime. Play is the instinct for freedom and for art, the drive that can harmonize man's two other and mutually murderous instincts, transforming the conflict between passion, the Sinnestrieb, and reason, the Formtrieb, into aesthetic pleasure. Man is mortal flesh, driven by the material instinct that enslaves him to nature through the passions and holds him back in a savage state. He is also a timeless spirit that obeys the instinct of reason, which organizes the world into abstract, pitiless principles that can reduce human life to barbarity (Letter XX).
Seriousness may address what is useful or moral, but only play engages the disinterested intensity that opens paths toward freedom (Letter XV).
Other philosophers who looked on as France convulsed in revolutionary spasms turned anxiously to political events, where they assumed the "great destiny of man is to be played out" (Letter II, 223); and they considered competing designs of the state in order to determine which was most useful for constructing and preserving civilization. But Schiller mistrusted the cold scrutiny and bracketed the big political questions. Instead, he went to the heart of the matter and to the heart of man when he identified the political crisis as an abandonment of the imaginative arts and therefore of freedom: "Utility is the great idol of the time, to which all powers do homage and all subjects are subservient. In this great balance of utility, the spiritual service of art has no weight, and, deprived of all encouragement, it vanishes from the noisy Vanity Fair of our time. The very spirit of philosophical inquiry itself robs the imagination of one promise after another, and the frontiers of art are narrowed, in proportion as the limits of science are enlarged" (Letter II, 223).
Schiller anticipates objections to his defense of play. Perhaps the young reader to whom he addresses these letters would prefer "a loftier theme than that of art," which probably seemed "unseasonable in desperate times" (Letter II, 222). Yet Schiller's promotion of the arts is quite practi-cal, he explains, because play can lead the way to liberty while political philosophy keeps missing its mark. Creative arts exercise the free play of imagination as they produce new forms, objects, and arrangements. Making something new, something for which there is no prior concept, is the liberating activity that raises man above his dual and dangerous nature. Only this playfulness can win some distance from the conflicting drives of sensuousness and reason in order to locate the freedom that art thrives on. True artists don't deny or avoid conflict; they struggle with it, energized by contending forces to produce beautiful new works that bear a mark of the freedom that enabled innovation. And that mark, made visible or audible to the public through a work of art, multiplies the experience of freedom into a shared or common sense on which to ground enlightened politics. By contrast, with play as a path toward liberty, the impulsive and deductive political philosophy of the French Revolution showed itself to be a top-down affair that was leading France to forfeit freedom. Inspired by an abstract ideal, philosophy had failed to take into account the complexity of human nature. Mere reason underestimated the real dangers of resistance and reprisal. This is why Hannah Arendt rejected idealist upheavals, from the French Revolution to the Bolshevik Revolution that it stirred up a century later. She much preferred the liberal and pragmatic American style of revolutionary independence that followed gradually from freely entered personal contracts and added up to a free state.
2 Were Arendt writing today, rather than in 1962, she might conclude that the excesses of liberal economics have outlived any revolutionary promise to level hierarchies and to reward individual effort. Mature economies have flourished and now flounder on the social and political asymmetries that liberalism leaves in its wake, both domestically and internationally. Developing states bear the burden of decisions made elsewhere and, when they can, struggle to emulate powerful counterparts in order to enter into economic accords, even when the political costs are high. 3 If liberal answers to the demand for political freedom now fail to show the way and if idealist approaches were misguided from the start, what route remains? Schiller would not have been stumped by the question, even if he had hoped to follow the liberal course and found it clogged, because the alternative he articulated to primarily political paths has real staying power.
It is play understood as artistic creativity that opens the only sure, if indirect, conduit to political freedom. Schiller insisted that "this matter of art is less foreign to the needs than to the tastes of our age; nay, that, to arrive at a solution even in the political problem, the road of aesthetics must be pursued, because it is through beauty that we arrive at freedom" (Letter II, 224). Almost anyone at the time of the French Revolution could see that those who pursue short-cuts to liberty as an abstract and reasonable principle, indifferent to human passions and material needs, do violence to the very humanity they would set free. Schiller's remedy for revolution is an aesthetic education that includes both playing with existing materials and appreciating the artworks that issue from it, because play exercises our human faculties in ways that embrace antagonism and contain it. To be moved by an aesthetically pleasing effect is to acknowledge, for a moment or for as long as the experience lasts, a success in wrestling material into new forms, repairing the damage that flesh and spirit do to one another. At precarious peace in the world, an artist or an admirer-both count as active citizens for Schiller, though real fans play at being artists-achieves freedom and invites others to share and to cultivate the experience. And, since wrestling with matter and circumstance takes discipline and training, Schiller offers his series of letters as encouragement and advice to develop the Spieltrieb.
Face to Face
Strategically, Schiller addresses himself to one reader, his patron Prince Friedrich Christian of Schleswig-Holstein-Augustenberg in Denmark. Framing his instruction through personal letters to a single interlocutor, rather than a general treatise addressed to a republic of readers, Schiller focuses on reforming one individual at a time. Even though he concedes that "the establishment and structure of true political freedom" is the most perfect work of art (Letter II, 223), to perfect that work meant first to prepare appropriate workers, in the shape of sturdy and judicious citizens. Unlike other arts that can transform raw material beyond recognition into new objects, pedagogy and politics demand a gentler touch; they depend on human beings as both the raw material and the ultimate users of the product: "The political [and educating] artist has to treat his material-man-with a very different kind of respect from that shown by the artist of fine art to his work. He must spare man's peculiarity and personality, not to produce a deceptive effect on the senses, but objectively and out of consideration for his inner being" (Letter IV, 229). The step-by-step aesthetic education offers a "subjective" transformation of each person's private war between conflicting drives into a knack for making public peace offerings. There is really no alternative because, unredeemed by the knack for play, man stays either torn in two or else just mired on one side in material appetites and arrested on the other by strictures of morality and law. Teaching takes time, Schiller admits, so we should be prepared to spend it. No quick fix will do for human development because rushing ahead of our "subjective" time-bound bodies to design an "objective" state derived from timeless ideals is sure to schiller and company suppress a good part of our humanity (Letter IV, 229). 4 The best part of humanity is our capacity to experiment, to rearrange and select existing materials, to imagine unprecedented combinations; that is, to play.
The unpredictable, disarming newness of the results remains the signpost for Schiller's aesthetic education; it had also been the sign of beauty for Kant's aesthetics. In contrast to Kant's emphasis on disengaged judgment, however, Schiller understood aesthetics to be an active exploration of the artistic process. Although his first letter announces that the series will "rest chiefly upon Kantian principles," with an apologetic ascription of any deviation to the writer's own incapacity, in fact, Schiller leaves the academic master behind and sets out to be a maestro in the double sense that Spanish and Italian give the role, as teacher and artist at once.
Even before Schiller recoiled at the relentless Formtrieb that drove the French Revolution to barbaric excess, Kant had worried about the arrogance of pure reason, "the officious pretensions of understanding."
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In response, he demonstrated that, in order to complete its own task of cognition, understanding needs to exercise judgment, 6 a faculty that depends on free and disinterested contemplation. Kant followed the consequences of disinterested pleasure with quiet dignity to ground a peaceful coexistence between knowing and feeling in the dependence of each on the judgment that we hone through aesthetic appreciation.
7 Yet momentous intervening events persuaded Schiller that Kant's reserved prescription was not strong enough to address the human condition:
Reason has done all that she could in finding the law and promulgating it; it is for the energy of the will and the ardour of feeling to carry it out. To issue victoriously from her contest with force, truth herself must first become a force, and turn one of the instincts of man into her champion in the empire of phaenomena. For instincts are the only motive forces in the material world. If hitherto truth has so little manifested her victorious power, this has not depended on the understanding, which could not have unveiled it, but on the heart which remained closed to it, and on instinct which did not act with it. (Letter VIII, 242)
Schiller's manifesto for active intervention had to stray beyond Kant's caution. How effective could judgment per se be when passions ran high and inflamed whole populations or else singed them into passivity with the dread of smoldering ruins? Difficult times needed outlets for the energy that would otherwise fight or fester; they needed ever new experiments to wrest pleasing forms from decaying matter. Schiller, the artist and maker of new things, girded for action to quell the rage of the Formtrieb against the slothfulness of the Sinnestrieb. Where the master had given aesthetic judgment the last word, the disciple smuggled the playful acts of making art into his missive. Kant had hoped for a truce based on understanding the distinct realms of abstract and interested reason. Yet Schiller knew that truces acknowledge a raging war and that stopping war requires energy. Judgment is only part of the creative trial and error process that the playdrive explores in order to harness antagonistic drives into works of art.
Kant's preference for judgment over creativity was surely a function of his democratizing spirit, which hoped to level social and personal asymmetries by locating a least common denominator. He remarked "how little difference there is between the learned and the ignorant in judging, while there is the greatest difference in making."
8 But Schiller refuses the flat baseline of judgment as a ground to cultivate our humanity and defends making, playing, as our dynamic common core. Evidently, Kant's criterion for comparing the works of learned and ignorant makers was the lasting value of their art; but for Schiller, the intensity of playing meant more than material results. Much as he admires the timeless equilibrium of ancient Greek art, he notes that perfectionism forfeits the freedom to stray from an ideal and he prefers the tortuous historicity of contemporary arts (Letter XVI). Kant had favored spectatorship over action, impartiality over taking part in history. "The importance of the occurrence is for him exclusively in the eye of the beholder," Arendt stresses, "in the opinion of the onlookers who proclaim their attitude in public. . . . The spectator is impartial by definition-no part is assigned him. Hence, withdrawal from direct involvement to a standpoint outside the game is a condition sine qua non of all judgment."
9 But the revolutionary spectacle on which Schiller had looked was one that swept practically everyone into action. Under such historic conditions, not to pursue freedom actively through art would be complicity with disaster. "Now man can be opposed to himself in a twofold manner: either as a savage, when his feelings rule over his principles; or as a barbarian, when his principles destroy his feelings. The savage despises art, and acknowledges nature as his despotic ruler; the barbarian laughs at nature, and dishonors it, but he often proceeds in a more contemptible way than the savage, to be the slave of his senses" (Letter IV, 229-30). When Walter Benjamin remarked that the history of civilization was also the history of barbarism he was evidently glossing Schiller's condemnation of reason run wild.
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Compared to Kant's warning against the self-defeating "officious pretensions" of understanding, Schiller's objection sounds almost shrill, and he is aware of this: "Have I gone too far in this portraiture of our times? I do not anticipate this stricture, but rather another-that I have proved too much by it. You will tell me that the picture I have presented resembles the humanity of our day, but it also bodies forth all nations engaged in the same degree of culture, because all, without exception, have fallen off from nature by the abuse of reason, before they can return to it through reason" (Letter VI, 232, my emphasis). The return to reason depends on working with passion. Rather than check reason with disinterested judgment, Schiller dispatches a Reason worthy of its name on a self-correcting detour through the passions. "Reason is obliged to make this demand, because her nature impels her to completeness and to the removal of all bounds; while every exclusive activity of one or the other impulse leaves human nature incomplete and places a limit in it" (Letter XV, 264).
Some act of disruption was needed to break the vicious circle of reasonable demands and material disasters. The circle locked out freedom from a state that depends on its citizens to exercise it; and citizens, in turn, depend on the state to structure the exercise of freedom by means of education. Kant had done no more than to syncopate the rhythm of history with halts for judgment of the world as it was, counting on an innate faculty even while he admitted that it needed training; Schiller's disruptive intervention was to offer that training to citizens understood as artists who can abstract from what is and imagine what could be. His step outside the vicious circle through the Spieltrieb is familiar to any citizen/artist. Play opens a space for a communication called art that deliberates dynamically. As a remedy for reason's abuses of nature and for nature's indifference toward reason, the playdrive takes a risk on the uncharted practice of creative arrangements.
Schiller's departure from Kant may also be considered as an extrapolation: when judgment identifies freedom in the appreciation of beauty, it also discloses a horizon of freedom that provokes us to make more art. "Soon it will not be sufficient for things to please him; he will wish to please" (Letter XXVII, 309). Creative play links individuals with the collective by leaving traces of particularity in the artwork, while the work also accesses a general freedom to produce responses, variations, new experiments. "Independently of the use to which it is destined, the object ought also to reflect the enlightened intelligence which imagines it, the hand which shaped it with affection, the mind free and serene which chose it and exposed it to view" (Letter XXVII, 309). When an artistic experiment succeeds, it invites or distracts even an unenlightened public to recognize, and eventually emulate, the man-made miracle of new forms built from existing material:
The gravity of your principles will keep them off from you, but in play they will still endure them. Their taste is purer than their heart, and it is by their taste you must lay hold of this suspicious fugitive. In vain will you combat their maxims, in vain will you condemn their actions; but you can try your moulding hand on their leisure. Drive away caprice, frivolity, and coarseness, from their pleasures, and you will banish them imperceptibly from their acts, and length from their feelings. Everywhere that you meet them, surround them with great, noble, and ingenious forms; multiply around them the symbols of perfection, till appearance triumphs over reality, and art over nature. (Letter IX, 247) This is no romantic brief promoting feeling over reason, no advice to aim for the heart instead of the head. Instead, Schiller holds out for enlightened, dispassionate taste as a common sense of value. "Their taste is purer than their heart." Cultivate that taste with real beauty, he adds in a Kantian spirit, and common sense will overtake pettiness. And since cultivation cannot prosper under the weight of Kant's grave and off-putting principles, Schiller incites us to play. We can enchant even unwilling subjects with more art than they will be able to resist; that way reluctant spirits can find freedom and not block the way. Reason is quite helpless here because arguments excite counterarguments but not the will to change. It was just this tendency, where counterarguments set off a spiral of reason and resistance, that led Michel Foucault, among others, to become skeptical about the possibility of real change, as if reason were the only faculty that mattered.
Play's the Thing
Schiller did not despair. Nor would John Dewey, Herbert Marcuse, 11 Paulo Freire, Antonio Gramsci, 12 Augusto Boal, 13 Antanas Mockus, or Jacques Rancière. These and other exemplary agents of change investigate the spirals of power and passion to locate notches or weak points that may admit interference. In Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1968), Freire called these points "limit situations" that can provoke innovative limit actions, interventions that go beyond currently legitimate procedure. 14 Mockus, the former mayor of Bogotá, Colombia, would call the openings ambiguous or unfinished moments of a narrative. 15 By a deceptively simple replacement of a preposition, Freire short-circuited the closed system of inversions that follows from Hegel's dialectic between masters, who become dependent on their slaves, and slaves, who master productive processes. The circle opens by interrupting the top-down and bottomup dynamic with two-way dialogue. Rather than work for the oppressed, in the vanguard manner of Georg Lukács and other Marxists who take the lead and thereby recreate the asymmetries they had rejected as bourgeois, Freire exhorts us to work shoulder to shoulder with the oppressed on creative projects that interrupt systematic unfairness. 16 When the oppressed get some power, they tend to become oppressors instead of building solidarity. Freire's solution to this problem is to play new games. Instead of vertical follow-the-leader, he invites us to play team sports that respect the initiative of each player in horizontal relationships that can add up to democracy. Liberty lives in the form of these lateral labor relations: curiously, the shape of this Marxist reformer's improved society looks a lot like liberal intersubjectivity among equals.
Freire's appreciation for ingenuity in everyone doesn't exactly depend on art, if you take his word for it. But his instructions for upsetting an oppressive status quo by way of disarming cultural interventions bring him into an inevitable conversation with artists and indirectly with Schiller. 17 For Freire, a systemic view of education would be paralyzing since change would seem impossible without the kind of liberating education that existing systems inhibit. The only effective approach to change is to create projects that force wedges of alternative education into systemic stratification and thereby disrupt oppressive stasis with dynamic models of equality. Freire may not call the disruptive innovations play or art, but the risk-taking collaborative experiments he advocated probably merit these names, even if they are not "purposeless" in the disinterested way that identifies art for Kant and for Schiller. 18 Freire is too powerful a partisan of educational reform for us to yield him up to a purist objection without lodging a counterargument on his behalf. For his pedagogy of the oppressed is a notably formal novelty, practically indifferent to the substance of lessons but alive to their relational grammar. Freire plays with conventional hierarchies of teacher and student, leader and follower, to scramble the order and level the players into risky horizontal relationships where a teacher's expertise can be humbled by a student's experience. I stress the points of contact between this pedagogy and Schiller's aesthetic education in order to underline their common grounding in dynamic exchanges between ideas and material reality.
Freire may be drawing from Schiller's legacy only indirectly. But an earlier twentieth-century educational reformer enlisted Schiller explicitly in a provocative defense of the artist in everyman as the cornerstone of democracy. I mean the philosopher John Dewey. His encomium to art as a fundamental human experience sounds practically paraphrased from the Aesthetic Education: "The existence of art is the concrete proof . . . that man uses the materials and energies of nature with intent to expand his own life, and that he does so in accord with the structure of his organism-brain, sense-organs, and muscular system. Art is the living and concrete proof that man is capable of restoring consciously, and thus on the plane of meaning, the union of sense, need, impulse and action characteristic of the live creature." 19 A fan of Schiller who thought about art "independently of the use to which it is destined" (Letter XXVII, 309), and a rather harsh critic of Kant's exemption of beauty from any practical purpose, Dewey considered art to be anything done with care, intensity, and satisfaction: 20 "the tense grace of the ball-player infects the onlooking crowd . . . the delight of the housewife in tending her plants . . . What Coleridge said of the reader of poetry is true in its way of all who are happily absorbed in their activities of mind and body." 21 This democratizing adjustment of registers specifically rejects specious distinctions between intellectuals and artists, bringing philosopher Dewey even closer to artist Schiller: "The difference between the esthetic and the intellectual is thus one of the places where emphasis falls in the constant rhythm that marks the interactions of the live creature with his surroundings. The ultimate matter of both emphases in experience is the same, as is also their general form. The odd notion that an artist does not think and a scientific inquirer does nothing else is the result of converting a difference of tempo and emphasis into a difference in kind." 22 Dewey didn't privilege one form over another. Instead he stayed close to Schiller by celebrating the intensity of serious play that took many and new forms.
"Form is experienced for itself" is Jacques Rancière's short-hand for Schiller's founding and "unsurpassable" manifesto for the "aesthetic regime" of art. Rancière defines this regime in contrast both to the "ethical regime of images," which cares more about content than about form, and to the "poetic or representative regime of arts," which privileges particular rules of genre and ways of making. For Rancière as for Schiller, art sets itself free in instances of pure suspension that are nevertheless indistinguishable from moments of daily life. "The aesthetic regime asserts the absolute singularity of art and, at the same time, destroys any pragmatic criterion for isolating this singularity. It simultaneously establishes the autonomy of art and the identity of its forms with the forms that life uses to shape itself." 23 Remarkably aligned with Dewey's appreciation for Schiller's everyman artist, Rancière never mentions the American philosopher, and he holds back from openly advocating the approach that looked so liberating before World War II in Dewey's 1932 essays. (Rancière doesn't mention Freire either, even though his Ignorant Schoolmaster [1987] would have found good company in the widely circulated Pedagogy of the Oppressed.) Though Schiller's aesthetic revolution "produced a new idea of political revolution" as the realization of a common and creative humanity and though this became the core of German Romanticism "summarized in the rough draft of a program written together by Hegel, Hölderlin, and Schelling," the political movement failed and tainted the aesthetic model with failure too: "Modernity thus became something like a fatal destiny based on a fundamental forgetting." 24 Rancière doesn't simply decry the loss; he also jogs our cultural memory to rediscover Schiller and company. It is too soon to declare defeat, he chides his relatively privileged colleagues, for an aesthetic regime that can still multiply and redistribute instances of art in egalitarian relation to life. It is also irresponsibly convenient, Rancière adds, for intellectuals to complain about collective losses while they do little to recover resources and instead live comfortably above the rubble.
The accusation of bad faith among dour critics recalls Schiller's objection to the willful and humorless dismissal of playfulness, one of whose virtues is to interrupt the complacency with which intellectuals are apt to regard the unhappiness of history. Play offers the surest way to lasting social progress, Schiller affirms in one letter after another. In any case, practically all other approaches to change build in their own self-defeating dynamic of resistance and rejection. Without pleasure there is no enduring progress, I am learning, because imposed change generates resentment and rebellion. Schiller underscored this lesson for me when I reread his Letters, especially the homily quoted above that urges us to charm the enemy when we cannot convince him. But the message came to me first from a contemporary master of play, Antanas Mockus, philosopher and former mayor of Bogotá.
Ice Breakers
First elected in 1995, Mockus took office when the city seemed beyond help. For more than a decade, general chaos had kept the capital off limits for tourists and had tormented residents. Given a level of corruption that turned investment against itself, the situation appeared hopeless. More money for economic recovery would deepen the pockets of drug dealers, and more armed police would escalate the number of guns and therefore the level of violence. What intervention could possibly make sense in this festering and volatile situation? When I ask this question of economists and political scientists, they think hard but then admit they are stumped. When I ask it of artists, they usually stall for more time, awaiting an inspiration from somewhere outside the box of familiar tools. As for Mockus, intellectually he understood his administration in social-scientific, rational, procedural terms designed to generate shared norms and to build consensus, along lines so centrally derived from Jürgen Habermas that some students affectionately called the mayor Professor Habermockus. But in practice, Mockus achieved consensus and civility by spiking communicative action with the kind of unconventional creativity we call play or art.
To revive a democratizing desire for civility, Mayor Mockus combined art and antics with accountability. As if Schiller were coaching him, the mayor turned to play in his efforts to reunite the body and soul of the city. 25 He broke the ice by replacing the corrupt traffic police with pantomime artists who multiplied their numbers by training new recruits from among the artists on the street. The unavoidable spectacle cre-ated a public of participant pedestrians and drivers who began to enjoy communication with strangers for the first time in over a decade and to revive a common sense of citizenship that dared to overcome fear and isolation. Pragmatism depends on a measure of hedonism, as well as on tough law enforcement and fiscal transparency: in philosophical summary, that combination was the general program this visionary mayor called "civic culture." The city that plays together stays alive to civic rights and obligations. In a recent interview, Mockus commented on several Latin American mayors who were eager to learn from his experience. 26 The mayor of Asunción, Paraguay was searching for new leads after thorough statistical analyses of the city's problems had failed to spark projects for amelioration, while the mayors of Mexico City and Belo Horizonte were willing to try playful interventions. Buenos Aires being risk-averse under its current mayor, Mockus concluded there was hardly anything creative to be done there.
Play assumes risks through uncharted moves that depend on freedom, and therefore demand it, moves that anticipate failures as cues for abandoning some experiments and constructing new ones. Play also admits to living in the shadow-life of mere appearances, to being blatantly counterfactual. When critics accuse Mockus of thinking counterfactually, he agrees with them but adds with almost impish self-evidence that it is impossible to think of change without appealing to counterfactual flights of imagination. The equivalent term in Schiller for counterfactual thinking is "appearance" (Schein), and he defends it at length against both "[e]xtreme stupidity and extreme intelligence" (Letter XXVI, 301). The one has no imagination, and the other refuses anything but ideal truth. They cannot or will not think outside the box of reality and consequently forfeit the freedom that appearance can exercise.
Deliberative Differences
Underdetermined and available for imaginative explorations, appearance is precisely the feature that draws Habermas to Schiller's Letters as an antidote to both the willfully naïve tendentiousness of surrealism and the withering intelligence of deconstruction. In the 1920s and '30s, surrealism had imagined that art worthy of its unconventional nature could dissolve the tensions built into modern life by plumbing a deep and irrational level of consciousness that dreamt away the distance between art and life. 27 By the 1970s, deconstruction revived this oneiric campaign against reasonable distinctions in a more philosophical register: if meaning is constructed from words, and words are artificial abstractions that overshoot or underestimate the things or actions they signify, then words schiller and company betray us; they mislead intentions and undermine communication. 28 Presumptively real information unravels under this rigorous scrutiny and leads practically nowhere. Both surrealists and deconstructionists exposed the fragile distinctions between data and desire, hoping finally to unhinge the gate, already worn down from centuries of skepticism about reasonable communication that separated art from life and rhetoric from literal meaning.
But for Habermas, the hinge is worth repairing, as he takes an "Excursus on Schiller" to get from one lecture on Hegel to another in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (1987) . By marking off fact from fiction, the gate of consciousness safeguards a realm for imagination. It marks a border crossing from the land of material and ideological conflicts-that run people aground-into the fresh air of counterfactual "appearances," which Schiller defended as the imaginary dimension that attests to human faculties for free speculation. Alongside the factual world of competition for limited resources and between conflicting ideas, there is a creative, disinterested region for the intersubjective communication that Schiller calls art and that Habermas claims as his own baseline for constructing collective agreements: "If art is to be able to fulfill its historic task of reconciling a modernity at variance with itself, it must not merely impinge on individuals, but rather transform the forms of life that individuals share. Hence, Schiller stresses the community-building, solidarity-giving force of art; its public character. The point of his analysis of the present is that in the modern conditions of life, particular forces could be differentiated and developed only at the cost of the fragmentation of the totality."
29 "Therefore, totality of character [of a society] must be found in the people which is capable and worthy to exchange the state of need for that of freedom" (Schiller, Letter IV, 230). And freedom issues from the joyous play of appearance, which is why Habermas defends play against surrealist blurring of the border between art and life and also against Nietzschean deconstruction of their difference. These facile egalitarianisms predictably collapse the imagination's room and stymie the dynamism that democracy depends on.
As a response to the often violent opposition between reason and desire that Habermas locates at the heart of modernity, art's sidestep from factual reality is not exactly the solution that we would expect from the theorist of communicative action-unless, that is, we take him at his word about Schiller and allow that art should be understood as free communication that builds community. In fact, the genealogy of ideas we traced above between Kant and Schiller gives us good warrant to do so. It was Schiller's friendly amendment to Kant's third Critique that taught Habermas to pick his way through modernity's deadlock between impersonal pure reason and embodied subjective practical reason. The Kantian bridge of aesthetic judgment, as expanded by Schiller into a dynamic process of autonomous creativity, underwrites Habermas's long sessions of communicative action. Schiller's unpretentious process made good, Habermas saw, on Kant's enlightened project to promote disinterested communication:
Kant's Critique of Judgment also provided an entry for speculative Idealism that could not rest content with the Kantian differentiations between understanding and sense, freedom and necessity, mind and nature, because it perceived in precisely these distinctions the expression of dichotomies inherent in modern life-conditions. But the mediating power of reflective judgment served Schelling and Hegel as the bridge to an intellectual intuition that was to assure itself of absolute identity. Schiller was more modest. He held on to the restricted significance of aesthetic judgment in order to make use of it for a philosophy of history. He thereby tacitly mixed the Kantian with the traditional concept of judgment, which in the Aristotelian tradition (down to Hannah Arendt) never completely lost its connection with the political concept of common sense. So he could conceive of art as primarily a form of communication and assign to it the task of bringing about "harmony in society": "All other forms of communication divide society, because they relate exclusively either to the private sensibility or to the private skillfulness of its individual members, that is, to what distinguishes between one man and another; only the communication of the Beautiful unites society, because it relates to what is common to them all." 30 I offer this fundamental connection between aesthetic education and discourse ethics as a tribute to Mayor Mockus and other daring public figures who may feel disinclined to call their work art and yet strive to adapt Habermas's communicative action in the service of local democracy. When I interviewed Mockus, he politely resisted my insistent line of questioning about the artistic cast of his administration, probably because the art label would somehow diminish, for some citizens, the seriousness of his efforts and accomplishments. All the same, convinced as he is that communicative action or discourse ethics is the principle of his politics, Mockus does admit to thinking like an artist-without theorizing why-when nothing else works. "When I feel trapped," he explains, "I ask myself, 'What would an artist do?'" 31 Perhaps there is less contradiction between communicative action and free play of the imagination than he or I had assumed, and fewer "unbridgeable gaps" than the inflexible categorical imperatives would locate as obstacles to negotiation.
Dismissive de Man
Schiller had surely encountered inflexibility, to judge from his irritation with the extreme stupidity and the extreme intelligence that would have no truck with the mere appearance that freedom depends on. The exasperated tone of his defense anticipated posthumous trouble from future readers. Paul de Man, for one, in an unfriendly reading of the Aesthetic Education would taunt Schiller for discrediting Kant as too stupid, and Hegel as too smart, to perceive Schiller's kind of beauty. 32 Protecting Kant and Hegel against Schiller in this way committed de Man to a willfully narrow reading of their respective projects. During the heyday of deconstruction, de Man dismissed Schiller for the same reasons that prompted Habermas to revive him as a stay against it.
De Man meant to diminish the seriousness of Schiller's accomplishments by limiting the legitimate uses of the word Schein to those anchored in existing phenomena as evidence of the real world and therefore appropriate for philosophy. But Schiller took the liberties he did with appearance so as to free it from contemporary philosophy's apologetic references to the real thing and to follow the erratic tangents of appearance into fictions beyond phenomenological perception. To dismiss imagination from the play of appearances and thereby to reduce the work of philosophy to a decision between correct and incorrect representations of the real world, betrays a misguided simplicity of thought like the one J. L. Austin denounced among philosophers who assumed that the only use of words is to make true or false statements. 33 Contra Schiller, de Man discredits the imagination's unfettered exercise through counterfactual appearance and adds a rather misogynist corollary argument as if to clinch his case: the preference for art, with its mass appeal, over elite philosophy amounts to a feminine preference for form over a masculine respect for content. 34 Hostile or grumpy, by dismissing women and Schiller in the same stroke because they allegedly favor frivolity and offend rigor, de Man also discounts the contrast Arendt draws between Hegel's elitism and Kant's frustrated ambition to popularize philosophy. By keeping "common sense" in common discourse but resignifying it as collective and disinterested judgment in all subjects, Kant inverted the order of importance from the few who enact history to the many who observe it, coming much closer to Schiller's mass appeal than de Man admits.
Reality is given and constrains us, but appearance, in Schiller's enabling use of the word, is a man-made effect. Appearance embodies the liberating and ludic pleasure of making something new. Schiller is careful to distinguish between appearance and deception; the one distances us from reality and so enables a critical perspective in order to intervene in it, and the other interferes in the real world surreptitiously. The distinction is meant to preempt a categorical dismissal of all the games of appearance. But some skeptics won't stop at useful boundaries, as Habermas complains and as de Man demonstrates. The excessive cau-tion exercised by a dehumanizing zeal for reality banishes "all the fine arts of which appearance is the essence," tragically sacrificing freedom when it ostracizes beauty "because it is only an appearance" (Letter XXVI, 302). Today, a grim seriousness refuses the broad-based seductions of art and eliminates the arts from public education, even while the business of art booms. Privileged producers play to curators and collectors, and these advantaged consumers value artworks as measures of their own elite taste and power of acquisition. But the fundamental playdrive, the actively creative faculty in all of us that Schiller was sure amounted to our talent for being human, has been relegated and reduced to dangerously narrow dimensions. 35 Ready?
Schiller's Letters can gird the reader with sound arguments against zealots and skeptics alike. The book is not so much a training manual for young artists as a coaching aid to help them keep up the effort in the face of discouragement. Kant may have imagined that his arguments depended only on clarity of thought and expression rather than on sentimental persuasion, though the redundancy and insistence of several arguments hint at some nervousness as to how they will be received. But Schiller is both frank and eloquent about his challenge to charm skeptics and win them over to art, so firm is his faith in humanity's deep sensitivity to beauty even when reason fails. The letters are seductive if persistent, and by the last one, only philistines refuse the invitation to play. html. For ease of reference, quotations from this work will be cited by both letter number and page number of this edition. Schiller's importance in the intellectual history of Germany is by no means confined to his poetry and dramas. He did notable work in history and philosophy, and in the department of aesthetics especially he made significant contributions, modifying and developing in important respects the doctrines of Kant.
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4 "But the state is an organization which fashions itself through itself and for itself, and for this reason it can only be realised when the parts have been accorded to the idea of the whole. The state serves the purpose of a representative, both to pure ideal and to objective humanity, in the breast of its citizens, accordingly it will have to observe the same relation to its citizens in which they are placed to it, and it will only respect their subjective humanity in the same degree that it is ennobled to an objective existence. If the internal man is one with himself, he will be able to rescue his peculiarity, even in the greatest generalisation of his conduct, and the state will only become the exponent of his fine instinct, the clearer formula of his internal legislation. But if the subjective man is in conflict with the objective and contradicts him in the character of the people, so that only the oppression of the former can give the victory to the latter, then the state will take up the severe aspect of the law against the citizen, and in order not to fall a sacrifice, it will have to crush under foot such a hostile individuality, without any compromise." Schiller, Letters Upon the AEsthetic Education, Letter IV, 229. 5 Immanuel Kant, preface to the first ed., Critique of Judgment, trans. James Creek Meredith (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2007), 167. For ease of reference, all quotations from Kant will cite the page number of the Akademie edition of his works. "For these concepts serve partly to restrain the officious pretensions of understanding, which, presuming on its ability to supply a priori the conditions of the possibility of all things which it is capable of knowing, behaves as if it had thus determined these bounds as those of the possibility of all things generally, and partly also to lead understanding, in its study of nature, according to a principle of completeness, unattainable as this remains for it, and so to promote the ultimate aim of all knowledge." Kant, preface, Critique of Judgment, 167-68. 6 "A critique of pure reason, i.e., of our faculty of judging on a priori principles, would be incomplete if the critical examination of judgment, which is a faculty of knowledge, and as such lays claim to independent principles, were not dealt with separately." Kant, preface, Critique of Judgment, 168. 7 In Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, Hannah Arendt would add-with the innocent mischief that Schiller would have recognized as play-that Kant never really wrote a political philosophy. The title of her book is a joke, she admits, both because Kant was too cautious to risk political attention and because a politics would have been redundant after his aesthetics. Arendt, Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, ed. Ronald Beiner (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1989), 7-9. The judgment of beauty that locates a commonality in freedom had done the work already. I suspect that Arendt also had in mind Schiller's bold manifesto for play, which made Kant's milder brief for judgment vibrate for her in retrospect with political purpose. See Svetlana Boym, "Poetics and 
